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Statutory Licences and Third Party Dealings: Property 
Analysis v Statutory Interpretation 
SHARON CHRISTENSEN, PAMELA O’CONNOR, W D DUNCAN AND ANNA LARK* 
Statutory licensing schemes are proliferating as a means of regulating commercial 
activity, resource exploitation and activities harmful to the environment. Statutes often 
declare that entitlements are non-transferable or are transferable only with approval 
or subject to conditions. Some entitlements, such as resource consents issued under 
the Resource Management Act 1991 (NZ), are declared not to be property. Despite 
these statutory declarations, entitlements are often held to be transferable in equity or 
to be property for the purposes of resolving private disputes. Recently, in Greenshell 
New Zealand Ltd v Tikapa Moana Enterprises Ltd, the High Court of New Zealand 
indicated that a resource consent was property that could support a claim for relief 
against forfeiture, continuing the trend in earlier cases that appear to depart from the 
statute. In this article we examine the juridical treatment of entitlements in private 
law. We identify factors influencing the courts’ enforcement of private arrangements 
which may circumvent the statutory intent. Our analysis will guide legislators in the 
design of provisions to implement new schemes. 
I  Introduction 
Statutory licensing schemes are proliferating throughout the common law world. The schemes 
are used to regulate a wide spectrum of activity including the over-exploitation of natural 
resources, the participation in economic activities and the emission of pollutants. What we 
will compendiously call an ‘entitlement’ is variously described in legislation as a licence, 
permit, allowance, allocation, quota, resource consent or concession. It authorises the holder 
to engage in an activity that is otherwise prohibited. Entitlements discussed in this article are 
broadly of three types: first, a permission to access a natural resource and to acquire rights in 
it by taking possession;1 second, a right to engage in an economic activity or the production or 
export of a commodity; and third, a permission to emit a specified quantity of a pollutant. 
Statutory entitlements have long been used to implement agricultural and economic policy 
and to manage natural resources such as minerals and fisheries. Since the success of the first 
emissions trading scheme as part of the United States Acid Rain Program introduced in the 
                                                 
*Professor Sharon Christensen, Queensland University of Technology (QUT), Co-Director, Commercial and 
Property Law Research Centre, Gadens Professor of Property Law; Consultant Gadens Lawyers; Professor 
Pamela O’Connor, University of the Sunshine Coast (USC), School of Law; Professor W D Duncan, 
Queensland University of Technology (QUT), Co-Director, Commercial and Property Law Research Centre, 
Faculty of Law; Anna Lark, Queensland University of Technology (QUT), Senior Research Associate, 
Faculty of Law. The authors acknowledge receipt of funding from the Australia Research Council, Discovery 
Project 130100607 “A Legal Framework for Specifying and Defining Carbon Property Rights”, although the 
views herein are those of the authors and are not those of the Council. The authors thank the anonymous 
reviewers for their helpful comments. 
1 For example, a right to fish and to take the fish captured. The quantity liable to be reduced into possession 
may be unlimited by law and thus dependant solely on nature’s bounty and the entitlement holder’s capacity. 
Alternatively, the holder may be entitled to a pre-determined share of the resource, usually expressed as a 
quota. 
1990s,2 many jurisdictions have introduced novel types of statutory allowances to manage 
diverse environmental problems such as climate change and deteriorating water quality.3 
Despite the longevity of statutory entitlements as a regulatory phenomenon, their integration 
into the legal system has not been seamless. 
A recurring theme in case law is whether or not these entitlements qualify as property (an 
inquiry we call ‘property analysis’). It is quite possible that a given entitlement may be 
property for one purpose, but not for another. Characterisation as property is significant in a 
number of contexts and has generated three categories of case. The first emanates from those 
jurisdictions in which property may not be taken without just compensation as a result of 
constitutional protections.4 In this category of case, claimants have alleged that the 
revocation, alteration or dilution of their entitlements is a taking for which compensation 
should be paid. In the second category, the proprietary status of an entitlement will determine 
whether or not it is subject to other statutes regulating the disposition of property upon 
bankruptcy, insolvency, domestic partnership dissolution or death, or whether it is subject to 
taxation or proceeds of crime legislation.5 The third category of case is concerned with the 
application of legal and equitable property doctrines to disputes between non-state parties 
concerning the ownership of these entitlements. 
Entitlements are commonly created under Acts (‘enabling Acts’) which are drafted with 
an eye to the first category. Governments wish to limit their liability to judicial review and 
compensation claims at the instance of entitlement holders who may claim that their interests 
are adversely affected by adjustments to the scheme. The spectre of such claims is a 
motivating factor for the inclusion in an enabling Act of a statutory provision which declares 
an entitlement to be non-proprietary (a ‘denial of property’ provision)6 or declares it to be 
non-transferable. Legislatures commonly make little provision for resolving the complex 
private law issues that can arise in third category cases, when non-state parties deal with 
entitlements as property.7 
From their inception, some types of entitlements are clearly intended to be transferable as 
property, such as emissions credits or allowances designed for emissions trading. The 
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transferability of certain other entitlements has emerged, not by legislative design, but 
through the operation of market forces and executive practice.8 
Legislation may deny that an entitlement is property, or prohibit or regulate its transfer, 
for various policy reasons. One reason, already mentioned, is to foreclose administrative law 
challenges or claims for compensation which might restrict the freedom of the regulator or the 
legislature to adjust the regulatory scheme in the public interest when circumstances change. 
Alternatively, the legislature may wish to prevent speculators from driving up the price of 
entry, to regulate the classes or attributes of entitlement holders, to prevent fragmentation of 
entitlements into derivative interests, to ensure minimum conditions or returns for those 
working in particular sectors, to secure the benefit of entitlements for members of a specific 
community such as an Indigenous people,9 or to achieve distributive justice goals. 
In this article we confine our property analysis to the third category of entitlement case, 
being those which pose a question as to whether property rules apply to a transaction between 
non-state parties. The term ‘non-state parties’ is used in this context to indicate that the 
executive agency which regulates the scheme (‘the regulator’), is not a party to the action. 
The cases commonly involve the co-ownership, transfer or grant of security in an entitlement, 
where the parties are private individuals or corporations. We have singled out this category of 
case because the argument for applying property law principles to supplement the statutory 
rules is stronger when the issue arises in a third party transaction and the regulator is not a 
party. Although the property analysis undertaken in the second category may affect third 
parties who have transacted with an entitlement holder,10 these cases are not examined here 
because they often turn on a particular statutory definition of property.11 Further, our article 
focuses primarily on entitlements that are expressly or impliedly non-transferable, 
transferable only with regulatory approval, or which were not created for the purposes of a 
market.12 
In Parts II and III we examine the juridical treatment of statutory entitlements across a 
number of common law jurisdictions and different statutory schemes. We argue that a 
common approach is discernible in the cases, pursuant to which courts treat entitlements as 
property. The approach is applied indiscriminately to a disparate collection of statutory 
entitlements in diverse circumstances. In Part IV we identify a number of factors which may 
be influencing the divergence between the statutory prescription of entitlements and their 
characterisation as property by the courts and consider the implications for the realisation of 
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statutory objectives. Finally in Part V we provide guidance for legislatures when designing 
legislation for statutory entitlements and identify questions for further research. 
II  Denial of Property Provisions 
When adjudicating disputes between non-state parties, courts readily extend property law 
principles to statutory entitlements to resolve issues on which the statute is silent. The 
approach has been employed in some cases despite express statutory provision that the 
entitlement in question is not property. In this Part we consider how New Zealand courts have 
resolved issues arising between private parties in relation to resource consents issued under 
the Resource Management Act 1991 (NZ) (RMA). Section 122 of the RMA states that 
resource consents are “neither real nor personal property”.13 They are transferable subject to 
different restrictions depending on the type of resource consent.14 New Zealand courts have 
demonstrated that they are willing to treat resource consents as akin to property for the 
purposes of resolving disputes arising in transactions between non-state parties. 
A Principle of survivorship 
In Armstrong v Public Trust, the High Court of New Zealand was faced with competing 
claims to an interest in a resource consent.15 Armstrong and his father acquired two coastal 
permits, a subcategory of resource consent, which authorised them to erect whitebait stands.16 
When his father died, Armstrong claimed to be entitled to the resource consents as the sole 
surviving joint tenant.17 His right was disputed by the Public Trust, which claimed part of the 
consent for the estate and for the residual beneficiary under the will, the deceased’s 
daughter.18 The Act provided for the devolution of a resource consent where it was held by 
one person.19 However, it failed to provide rules where the consent was “co-owned”. 
Unsurprisingly, the Public Trust relied on s 122.20 Fogarty J rejected the Public Trust’s 
argument, observing: 
 
[23] This Court will not find that the legislature has so intervened to displace the common law 
position as to joint tenancy, by a side wind, when pursuing control over the allocation of scarce 
resources, as it is doing in the RMA. To the extent that it does in fact allow property rights 
under the RMA, the common law as to real and personal property will apply, subject to 
constraints in the specific provisions of the statute. 
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14 Sections 134–137. 
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16 At [1]. 
17 At [2]–[4]. 
18 At [4] and [5]. 
19 At [6]; s 122(2)(a). 
20 At [6] and [8]–[9]. 
His Honour’s refusal to construe s 122 strictly in accordance with its terms has attracted 
considerable attention in the literature because it appears to contradict the statutory denial of 
property in s 122.21 
B Equitable relief against forfeiture 
Armstrong v Public Trust is not an isolated instance of the application of property principles 
despite the provision in s 122 of the RMA. More recently in Greenshell New Zealand Ltd v 
Tikapa Moana Enterprises Ltd (Greenshell v Tikapa), the High Court of New Zealand 
considered whether resource consents constituted property which could be the subject of the 
court’s equitable jurisdiction to grant relief against forfeiture.22 Kennedy Bay Mussel 
Company (NZ) Ltd (“KBMC”) was a family company that had been involved in mussel 
farming pursuant to a number of resource consents.23 In 2006, KBMC purported to “lease” 
and “sub-license” its rights of use and occupation of the marine coastal area to Greenshell 
New Zealand Ltd (“Greenshell”).24 Under the RMA, coastal permits may be transferred in 
whole or part unless contrary provision is made in the consent or a regional coastal plan.25 A 
transfer has “no effect until written notice … is given to the consent authority”.26 
Pursuant to the relevant deeds, KBMC had a right to re-enter the marine coastal area and 
determine Greenshell’s rights on the occurrence of certain specified acts of default, including 
the company going into receivership.27 In late 2013, receivers and managers were appointed 
to Greenshell.28 The company continued to operate and the receivers solicited potential buyers 
for the business as a going concern.29 The receivers were unable to finalise a sale of the 
business because the transfer or assignment of the rights under the deeds required KBMC’s 
prior written consent.30 In February 2014, KBMC exercised its right of re-entry and 
termination.31 
Greenshell applied to the High Court for “relief preventing cancellation” of its rights 
under the agreements,32 an application which was opposed by KBMC.33 Cooper J took the 
view that the statutory mechanism for relief against cancellation was unavailable due to the 
provision in s 122(1) of the RMA.34 Accordingly, the court’s equitable jurisdiction to grant 
relief was invoked.35 KBMC opposed the application on the grounds that a proprietary 
foundation for the equitable jurisdiction was lacking. In particular, Counsel for KBMC 
submitted that the jurisdiction did not arise “because there was no contract to transfer 
property or possessory rights”.36 Cooper J rejected this contention holding that the rights 
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24 At [3]. 
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26 Section 135(2). 
27 Greenshell v Tikapa, above n 22, at [11]–[12] and [23]–[25]. 
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31 At [22]–[25]. 
32 At [1]. 
33 At [6] and [26]. 
34 At [31]. 
35 At [28] and [31]. 
36 At [32]. 
conferred on Greenshell were sufficiently proprietary.37 This was so despite the fact that the 
resource consents, from which Greenshell’s rights were derived, were expressly stated not to 
be real or personal property in the enabling statute: 
 
[34] Notwithstanding the provision of s 122 of the Resource Management Act, the rights 
conferred by the agreements in the subject case seem to me so closely analogous to property 
rights that it would be unduly formalistic to hold that in an appropriate case relief might not be 
granted in the Court’s equitable jurisdiction. This is so because, although the rights could not 
exist without appropriate consents under the Resource Management Act, the parties have 
agreed on terms upon which the areas subject to the resource consent can be used by 
Greenshell, and they have also reached agreement as to the value to be accorded to the exercise 
of that right. 
 
In support of this conclusion, Cooper J relied on the following comments made by the High 
Court in Aoraki Water Trust v Meridian Energy Ltd (Aoraki):38 
 
While permits are not themselves either real or personal property, what is determinative in our 
view is that, when granting the consents, the CRC created the right in Meridian to take, use or 
divert property, being surface water in Lake Tekapo, for a defined term at maximum rates and 
quantities and for maximum periods. Mr Milne’s concession that Meridian’s consents are of 
considerable economic value is explicable only on the basis of a recognition that such value 
derives from the holder’s rights to use the property in accordance with its permits. 
 
In Aoraki, the nature of a resource consent to divert and use water was considered in the 
context of a subsequent third party application for a water use consent in circumstances where 
the water source was already over-allocated.39 Although the Court applied the property law 
principle of non-derogation from a grant,40 Aoraki concerned the allocation of rights to a 
resource rather than a third party dealing in a resource consent. As such, the relevance of this 
case to the present inquiry is merely contextual.41 Commentators have criticised the reasoning 
of the Court in Aoraki because it rests on a premise which is contrary to common law, 
namely, that water in its natural state can be property.42 
Returning to Greenshell v Tikapa, Cooper J’s statements as to the proprietary status of 
consents and interests carved out of them were obiter, since other preconditions for relief 
were wanting. Relief against forfeiture may only be granted in respect of forfeiture provisions 
that are security for the performance of another obligation, or where the forfeiture is tainted 
by fraud, mistake, accident, or surprise.43 Further, relief is only granted where the person 
                                                 
37 At [34] and [36]. 
38 Aoraki Water Trust v Meridian Energy Ltd [2005] 2 NZLR 268 (HC), cited in Greenshell v Tikapa, above n 
22, at [35]. 
39 At [1]–[2], [9] and [15]. 
40 At [36]. See Barry Barton “The Nature of Resource Consents: Statutory Permits or Property Rights” (1 
August 2010) Resource Management Law Association of New Zealand Inc <www.rmla.org.nz> at 2–5 and 
David Grinlinton “Evolution, Adaptation, and Invention: Property Rights in Natural Resources in a Changing 
World” in David Grinlinton and Prue Taylor (eds) Property Rights and Sustainability: The Evolution of 
Property Rights to Meet Ecological Challenges (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 2011) 275 at 294 and 295 for a 
discussion of cases applying and refining this principle. 
41 The Court’s application of property principles appears to have been influenced by the resource management 
objectives of the enabling Act. See Aoraki, above n 38, at [28]–[30]. 
42 Philip Milne “Allocation of Public Resources under the RMA: Implications of Aoraki Water Trust v 
Meridian” [2005] Resource Management Theory & Practice 146 at 158–159; Fraser, above n 12, at 172. See 
also David Grinlinton, above n 21, at 38–39. 
43 JD Heydon, MJ Leeming and PG Turner Meagher, Gummow & Lehane’s Equity: Doctrines and Remedies 
(5th ed, LexisNexis Butterworths, New South Wales, 2015) at 588–589. 
entitled to forfeit can be compensated in respect of the event giving rise to the forfeiture.44 
Cooper J was not satisfied that the forfeiture provision was designed to secure a particular 
result.45 Nor was he satisfied that the breach could be rectified by compensation, if the court 
were to grant relief.46 
The remarks of Cooper J on this point are a further indication that, at least for the purpose 
of adjudicating transactions between non-state parties, New Zealand courts are willing to treat 
resource consents as akin to property.47 It is arguable that it is reasonable for them to do so as 
the legislature has created valuable entitlements and has failed to provide statutory decision 
rules (‘specifications’) for adjudicating private claims to the entitlements. The courts are, in 
effect, supplementing the statutory provisions by implying additional specifications from 
common law and equity. 
III  Statutory Restrictions on Transfer 
While New Zealand uses denial of property provisions to retain control of the secondary 
allocation of entitlements, in other jurisdictions legislatures have attempted to achieve the 
same result by prohibiting transfer, or by allowing it only with the approval of a regulator. In 
this Part we examine how provisions of this type have been applied by courts in Canada, 
Australia and the United Kingdom, in contexts where non-state parties have attempted, 
without the regulator’s authority, to transfer entitlements in equity by means of an express 
trust. We also examine cases where parties have purported to create security interests in 
entitlements. 
The cases discussed in this Part illustrate that the enforcement of private transactions 
outside an entitlement’s statutory framework as if it were property may raise a number of 
problems. The creation and allocation of entitlements may be intended by the legislature to 
serve particular social, economic and environmental purposes. Some, such as credits and units 
for emissions trading, are designed to be freely transferable in markets. Others are intended to 
be held, and in some cases used, by persons of a particular class or possessing a particular 
attribute. Enabling Acts often include provisions that appear to be designed to secure this 
result, including prohibitions on transfer or on the use of an entitlement by another person. 
Alternatively, an enabling Act or an executive policy may permit transfers or surrender and 
reissue only with regulatory approval. Such restrictions on the reallocation of entitlements can 
be circumvented and rendered ineffective if courts give proprietary effect to private 
transactions in equity. 
A Express trusts 
(1) Canadian fishing entitlements 
In a number of cases, courts have recognised beneficial ownership of entitlements in order to 
give effect to the arrangements of non-state parties outside the scope of the statutory 
framework. The potential for the arrangements to conflict with statutory objects is 
demonstrated by a series of Canadian cases in which the courts have enforced express trusts 
                                                 
44 At 582–583 and 593. 
45 Greenshell v Tikapa, above n 22, at [45]–[46]. 
46 At [44] and [46]. 
47 Our researches have not discovered cases from other jurisdictions which have considered or applied the 
doctrine of relief against forfeiture in the context of statutory entitlements. For another example of the 
application of general principles of property law to a resource consent see Cavell Leitch Pringle & Boyle v 
Thornton Estates Ltd [2008] NZCA 191, [2008] 3 NZLR 637 at [43]. 
created with respect to fishing licences.48 This is despite the fact that these licences are only 
“transferable” as a matter of policy,49 not law,50 and that the trust device has been employed 
to circumvent statutory restrictions and executive policy guidelines. 
The conflict with statutory objects is exemplified by the decision of the Court of Appeal 
of British Columbia in British Columbia Packers Ltd v Sparrow (BCP v Sparrow).51 At the 
relevant time, a herring licence was transferable but only with regulatory approval.52 
Additionally, the regulations prohibited the use of an Indian herring licence by a non-Indian.53 
Despite these restrictions the plaintiff company (‘BCP’) purchased a herring licence and 
vessel from Sparrow, an Indian.54 Since the licence was not transferable to BCP, the 
agreement purported to transfer the “benefit of the licence for the use of [BCP]”.55 The 
arrangement continued for more than five years before the relationship deteriorated and 
Sparrow refused to renew the licence.56 BCP initiated proceedings seeking to enforce the 
agreement, and was successful despite Sparrow’s contention that the agreement was illegal.  
On appeal the Court of Appeal of British Columbia stated: 57 
 
… one can search the statute and regulations and find no prohibition of transfer of beneficial 
interest in a herring licence. The restrictions only apply to dealing with the legal title.  
 
The Court of Appeal endorsed the reasoning of the trial judge who had concluded that the 
trust was not illegal.58 In doing so, the trial judge relied on another entitlement case, Ernst v 
Dumlich,59 which in turn applied Re Stratford and CUPE.60 The latter case was not an 
entitlement case, nor was it concerned with equitable jurisdiction. In Re Stratford and CUPE, 
the principle that a statute must clearly prohibit parties from entering into an agreement 
before it will be declared illegal was formulated in the context of a collective agreement 
governing employment.61 The arrangement was purely contractual and equity’s intervention 
was not required to enforce it. Nonetheless, the principle was applied in Ernst v Dumlich, 
where the Court gave effect to an agreement by which a foreigner held a trapline registration 
beneficially.62 Trapline registrations and trapping licences are entitlements that authorise the 
hunting of fur bearing animals.63 Foreigners were disqualified from holding both types of 
                                                 
48 See David G Henley “The Property Status of Fishery Licences” (2005) 28 Dalhousie LJ 501 at 506–508 for 
an earlier review of Canadian cases concerning fishing licences and other entitlements focusing on category 
two cases. 
49 Department of Fisheries and Oceans “Commercial Fisheries Licensing Policy for the Gulf Region” (10 
August 2010) Fisheries and Oceans Canada <www.glf.dfo-mpo.gc.ca> at [11.3]; “Commercial Fisheries 
Licensing Policy For Eastern Canada – 1996” (1 July 1996) Fisheries and Oceans Canada <www.dfo-
mpo.gc.ca> at cl 16. 
50 Fishery (General) Regulations, SOR/93-53, s 2 (definition of “document”) and s 16. Previously, transfers 
were permitted subject to approval: BCP v Sparrow (BCCA), above n 9, at [5]. 
51 BCP v Sparrow (BCCA), above n 9. 
52 At [5] and [8]. 
53 At [6]–[9]. The term ‘Indian’ is used in the case in a legal context to refer to the legal identity of a First 
Nation person with Indian status under the Indian Act, as in force at the relevant time. 
54 At [1]–[2]. 
55 British Columbia Packers Ltd v Sparrow (1988) 22 BCLR (2d) 302 (SC) at [7] [BCP v Sparrow (BCSC)]. 
56 BCP v Sparrow (BCSC), above n 55, at [7]–[8]. 
57 BCP v Sparrow (BCCA), above n 9, at [15]. 
58 At [14]. 
59 Ernst v Dumlich (1985) 19 BCLR (2d) 155 (CA) [Ernst v Dumlich (BCCA)] cited in BCP v Sparrow (BCSC), 
above n 55, at [19]–[21]. 
60 Re Stratford and CUPE (1980) 28 OR (2d) 734, 111 DLR (3d) 457 (Ontario Divisional Court) cited in Ernst 
v Dumlich (BCCA) at [19]–[20]. 
61 At [9]. 
62 Ernst v Dumlich (BCCA), above n 59, at [5] and [19]–[20]. 
63 Ernst v Dumlich (1984) 55 BCLR 285 (SC) [Ernst v Dumlich (BCSC)] at [44]. 
entitlement under the statutory scheme.64 In response to counsel’s submission that 
enforcement of the agreement would “subvert the whole intention”65 of the Act by permitting 
foreigners to hold licences, Hinkson JA stated:66 
 
[25] If the legislature wishes to enact stricter provisions with respect to the transfer of trapline 
licences to nominees of foreign owners, it may do so, of course, but in the absence of such 
provisions I am unable to conclude that the learned trial judge was correct in concluding that 
the whole transaction was illegal and unenforceable.  
 
The legislation was silent as to the transferability of registrations. However, as a matter of 
executive practice, the entitlements were transferable with the Department’s consent, by 
relinquishment and reissue.67 The Court of Appeal explained the process as follows: 
 
[14] There is no prohibition in the Wildlife Act against transferring a trapline [registration]. 
The practice followed by the department is to require the holder of such licence to sign a form 
of relinquishment naming an assignee and, if the assignee meets the requirements of the 
department, then a new licence is issued in the name of the assignee. 
 
Pursuant to regulations, it was not permissible to hold a registered trapline without also being 
licensed as a trapper.68 Such licences were declared by the statute to be non-transferable.69  
In Ernst v Dumlich, the Court’s enforcement of the transaction permitted the parties to 
“transfer” the economic benefit of the entitlement. However, when the Court of Appeal in 
British Columbia followed Ernst v Dumlich in BCP v Sparrow, it overlooked an important 
distinction between the two transactions. It appears from the judgment of the court below that 
the transaction between BCP and Sparrow purported to transfer the right to use the licence in 
addition to the economic benefit:70 
 
Pursuant to [the] agreement, [Sparrow] undertook to “do all things necessary or proper to 
secure the benefit of the licence for the use of [BCP], in connection with the use of [its 
vessels]”. 
 
The trial judge described the implementation of the agreement as follows: “B.C. Packers 
Limited would participate in the roe herring fishery under what they thought were their rights 
to use Mr. Sparrow’s licence.”71 
Despite the fact that the reasoning is unpersuasive, and that the current regulations 
provide expressly that licences are non-transferable,72 BCP v Sparrow remains authoritative.73 
It was followed in Loder v Citifinancial Canada Inc, when the Court of Appeal of 
Newfoundland and Labrador reversed a Supreme Court decision refusing to give effect to a 
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trust.74 The plaintiff did not satisfy the residency requirements to hold the fishing licence and 
was precluded from holding more than one licence.75 Accordingly, when the plaintiff 
purchased an additional licence, he procured a transfer from the vendor to a qualifying third 
party, Mangrove, who agreed to hold the licence on trust.76 The dispute arose when 
Mangrove’s judgment creditors claimed funds derived from the quota attached to the 
licence.77 
In addition to the decision in BCP v Sparrow,78 the Court of Appeal in Loder v 
Citifinancial Canada Inc relied on a number of other decisions including that of the Nova 
Scotia Court of Appeal in Theriault v Corkum.79 The latter case concerned the use of a trust to 
evade a Ministerial policy that a licence could only be transferred once every 12 months.80 
The parties purported to transfer the licence by means of a trust prior to the expiration of the 
mandated period. The case is relevant in so far as the court considered the policy behind the 
regulatory framework.81 
The dispute in Theriault v Corkum was initially aired at arbitration, resulting in a finding 
that the agreement to transfer and hold the entitlement on trust was not illegal.82 This finding 
was challenged in the courts. The arbitrator heard and accepted evidence from a Departmental 
officer about the policy concerns of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO).83 In the 
words of the Court of Appeal, the Arbitrator concluded that, “the principal concern of the 
Department is to ensure compliance with the regulatory requirements by the registered license 
holder”.84 Hallett JA giving the reasons of the Court made a number of observations to justify 
its conclusion that the beneficial interest in a licence was transferable:85 
 
The policy of the Department recognizes that licences are in effect transferable (Policy No. 
17). The learned arbitrator appears to have accepted the evidence before him that trust 
arrangements are widespread in the fishing industry and that the principal concern of the 
Department is to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements by the registered licence 
holder. It would seem that business efficacy necessitates there be some trust arrangement with 
respect to the holding of licences until they can be transferred if sales of fishing boats are to be 
facilitated. 
 
Later in the judgment Hallett JA stated:86  
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Clearly the policy of the Department permits the reissuance of a license to a new license 
holder. The Department is well aware of the trust agreements used in the fishery to facilitate 
the ownership and transfer of boats … 
 
The decision is notable because in reaching its conclusion that the beneficial interest in a 
licence was transferable pursuant to a trust, the court did consider the statutory policy behind 
a regulation prohibiting the use of another’s licence or permitting another to use one’s 
licence.87 However, in doing so the Court construed the purpose by reference to executive 
policy. The Court of Appeal’s comments on this point are worth quoting at length:88 
 
[24] The object and purpose of Regulation 21 is to prevent a holder of a license from allowing 
another to use it. Its object and purpose is not to frustrate the sales of boats to registered 
fishermen. Regulation 21 ought not to be interpreted as impliedly prohibiting temporary trust 
agreements that are necessary to facilitate the transfer of fishing boats and the reissuance of the 
necessary license by the Minister when that can be done as provided in Policy 17. The 
argument of the appellants that the contract was for the sale of a license is not sound as the 
parties clearly recognized the licence was only transferable on application when eligible and 
that reissue was in the discretion of the Minister. While the choice of words used … could 
have been more precise the clear intent of the contract documents is that the transaction was 
for the sale of a fishing boat conditional on the reissue of the license by the Minister. Both 
Theriault and Corkum were well aware that the license could not be transferred by the 
contractual documents; that is why the declaration of trust and other documents were signed. I 
would not characterize this transaction as an attempt to circumvent the law … 
 
[25] If there is any illegality it is not with respect to the contract … but rather it is one of 
fishing contrary to Regulation 21. It may technically have been an offence for Theriault to 
have permitted the respondents to fish and for the respondents to have fished off the license. 
 
As in BCP v Sparrow, the parties in Theriault v Corkum purported to transfer the right to use 
the licence, not merely the economic benefit. Since the dispute was initially determined by 
arbitration, the Court’s powers of review were limited. In particular, an arbitrator’s 
interpretation of the law will not be in error unless it is “so patently unreasonable that its 
construction cannot be rationally supported by the relevant legislation”,89 or if it is 
“unreasonable”, depending on the statutory context.90  
Returning to Loder v Citifinancial,91 the Court of Appeal of Newfoundland and Labrador 
acknowledged that the use of the trust mechanism in that case was contrary to statutory 
policy. Mercer JA, in whose judgment Welsh JA concurred, stated: “The circumvention of 
statutory policy objectives through trust agreements is a matter best left to DFO which can 
address any problems in a comprehensive manner.”92 Rowe JA endorsed this statement.93 
However, he went further in acknowledging the effect of the Court’s decision on the statute’s 
policy objectives, observing more explicitly that “[t]rust agreements, like that given effect in 
this case, evade and thereby undermine fisheries policies such as fleet separation and 
adjacency. That is their purpose.”94 Rowe JA expressed the view that the Court’s enforcement 
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of such trusts contrary to the statutory policy was a departure from the usual practice of 
declining to give effect to “agreements that are contrary to public policy”.95 
The context of the dispute in Loder v Citifinancial illustrates the potential impact on third 
parties of enforcing trust arrangements. As noted, the dispute involved competing claims of 
entitlement to the proceeds of the licence as between judgment creditors of the legal holder 
and the beneficiary of the trust. Although the plaintiff had filed a registration at the Personal 
Property Security Register identifying Mangrove as debtor,96 such an action may not always 
occur. Further, depending on the jurisdiction, personal property security legislation may not 
provide for the registration of security interests against statutory entitlements.97 Without a 
requirement to perfect the interest by registration, the enforcement of express trusts could 
work injustice to creditors. 
(2) Australian cases on fishing entitlements 
Australian courts have also held that a fishing licence may be transferred in equity by means 
of an express trust.98 In Tasmanian Seafoods Pty Ltd v Peters, the Supreme Court of 
Queensland held that a deed was effective to transfer the beneficial title to a master pearler’s 
licence.99 At the time of the agreement, the statute did not provide for the transfer of the 
licence and Wilson J concluded that it was impliedly non-transferable.100 Consequently, in 
order to effect a sale of the licence, the parties executed a deed providing for the transfer of 
the beneficial interest in the licence.101 The deed further provided that the vendor would hold 
the licence upon trust, and would transfer the legal title should this become possible.102 
Approximately three years later, the entitlement became transferable and the plaintiff 
requested the transfer contemplated by the deed.103 The defendant not only failed to complete 
the necessary documentation but he entered into an agreement to sell the entitlement to a third 
party.104 The plaintiff sought an order for specific performance of the agreement.105 In Wilson 
J’s view, she could only grant specific performance if the licence was property that could be 
held on trust.106 Her Honour set out the test for property provided in National Provincial Bank 
Ltd v Ainsworth and Mason J’s addendum in R v Toohey; Ex parte Meneling Station, 
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observing that transferability is not a universal indicator of property.107 Wilson J reviewed 
numerous Australian cases that held a fishing licence to be property but noted that most of the 
decisions concerned licences that were transferable.108 Her Honour came to the following 
conclusion as to the nature of the master pearler’s licence:  
 
[28] In my view, the licence in question in the present case did have the character of property. 
There was an implied prohibition on transfer of the legal title, but no such implied prohibition 
on transfer of the beneficial title. Accordingly, it could be the subject of a trust. 
 
The only feature of the legislative scheme that Wilson J relied on in her analysis of legislative 
intent was a provision prohibiting inspectors from holding an “interest” in a licence. Wilson J 
observed: “It is not insignificant that the Act itself contemplated that there might be ‘an 
interest in’ a licence or permit …”109 This factor appears to have influenced her decision. 
Wilson J granted orders for specific performance and an account of profits.110 Although 
she did not analyse the statutory policy, her Honour noted a submission by counsel that: 111 
 
… the legislation was directed at ensuring that the licensee exploited the fishery responsibly 
and that it was not directed at or concerned with who got the benefit of the fruits of that 
exploitation; in other words, that there was no implied barrier to the transfer of the beneficial 
interest. 
 
The posited distinction, between exercising the rights of the licensee to take fish and owning 
the profits, is not apparent from the agreement between the parties in that case. In the 
agreement, the defendant warranted that “there [were] no outstanding charges or restrictions 
on the [licence] … which shall hinder or prevent the Company from the absolute and 
unfettered and unrestricted use of the [licence]”.112 The defendant was also required to 
“revoke all existing permits [and] nominations to allow any other person to collect beche-de-
mer pursuant to the Permit or otherwise use the Permit”.113 
B Security interests 
Courts have recognised that the beneficial interest in an entitlement may pass in equity 
despite the fact that a transfer at law is subject to regulatory approval. This has enabled courts 
to give effect to securities over entitlements. An example is the decision of Poulos Bros 
(Wholesale) Pty Ltd v Abbott (Poulos v Abbott), in which the Supreme Court of Tasmania 
enforced a security granted in respect of a crayfish-pot licence.114 In order to finance the 
purchase of the disputed licence, Stephen Abbott required a bank loan.115 The plaintiff agreed 
to guarantee repayment in return for which Abbott purported to grant a security over the 
licence by means of an assignment.116 However, as a result of the failure to comply with the 
legislative requirements for transfer, the assignment was ineffective at law.117 Following a 
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thorough review of the Australian case law on entitlements,118 Zeeman J held that the licence 
constituted property.119 As such it was capable of being mortgaged and was subject to the 
equitable principles governing the transfer of beneficial ownership.120 In particular, his 
Honour applied the principles that a purported present transfer of property for valuable 
consideration is effective to pass beneficial ownership if the contract is one of a kind for 
which equity would decree specific performance and that: 121 
 
… where a transaction takes the form of a present but ineffectual assignment for valuable 
consideration the purported assignment will give rise to an implied contract to perfect the 
assignment and creates a present mortgage in equity. 
 
Zeeman J rejected the defendant’s contention that a decree of specific performance was 
unavailable where a legal transfer was subject to ministerial approval, noting that a court may 
enjoin the plaintiff “to do what [is] necessary to … obtain any necessary consent”.122 
Accordingly, the arrangement was sufficient to create an equitable security interest. 
The decision of Zeeman J did not resolve the dispute in its entirety, which involved a 
priority contest between the plaintiff and a third party who had taken a transfer of the licence 
non bona fide.123 Zeeman J’s final conclusion was that the agreement to transfer was effective 
in equity:124 
 
… the document described as a bill of sale … was ineffective to transfer [the] crayfish-pot 
licence … to the plaintiff but was effective as an agreement to do so and vested the beneficial 
interest therein in the plaintiff, subject to the proviso for redemption therein contained. 
 
The judgment contains no analysis of the statutory framework, in particular regarding the lack 
of any express right to transfer, and the requirement for approval. The provisions cited in the 
judgment suggest that the restriction was directed towards securing particular economic or 
social objectives.125 One of the objectives appears to have been to prevent wholesalers 
acquiring licences. Under the regulations, the Minister was only authorised to issue licences 
to the owner of a prescribed fishing boat, and the power to approve a transfer was limited to 
applicants who were “principally engaged only in the occupation of fishing in State fishing 
waters”.126 The claimant Poulos was a fish wholesaler,127 apparently unqualified for a 
transfer. 
Poulos v Abbott differs from a number of the trust cases analysed above in that the parties 
merely purported to transfer the economic benefit of the licence. There is no indication that 
the parties intended to transfer to Poulos the right to use the licence. 
Another case in which the court enforced an equitable security over an entitlement despite 
a restriction on transfer is Swift v Dairywise Farms Ltd.128 The case concerned a dispute over 
milk quota.129 Pursuant to a financing scheme, farmers transferred milk quota to Dairywise 
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Farms as security for loans from a third company, Dairywise Ltd.130 The arrangement was 
necessary because the lender, Dairywise Ltd, did not possess milk producing land to which 
quota could be attached.131 Dairywise Ltd went into liquidation at a time when many of the 
debts remained unpaid.132 Accordingly, the liquidator sought to enforce the security. The 
dispute arose when the entity controlling Dairywise Farms refused to cooperate.133 Both the 
lender and Dairywise Farms were controlled by the same family, and the land to which the 
quota were attached was held in trust by a family pension fund.134 The trustees of the land 
denied that they held the quota on trust for Dairywise Ltd.135 In the High Court, Jacob J 
indicated that certain interests may be held on trust despite being non-assignable.136 However, 
he clearly took the view that milk quota was transferable and satisfied the test for statutory 
property expounded by Morritt LJ in Re Celtic Extraction.137 Jacob J observed:138 
 
Quota has commercial value and a legal effect. Merely because there are limitations on how it 
may be held or conveyed is not a reason for equity to refuse to impose a trust where 
conscience so requires. 
 
A different approach to restrictions on transfer was applied by the New South Wales Supreme 
Court in Smith v Prestige Limousines Pty Ltd.139 The case concerned a purported assignment 
by way of mortgage of four hire car plates.140 Transfers were restricted to persons engaged in 
the conduct of a hire car business, although it is unclear from the judgment whether the source 
of the restriction was statute or executive policy.141 Since the plaintiff was not qualified to 
take a transfer of the plates,142 Cohen J held that the security took effect as an equitable 
charge rather than a mortgage.143 
An equitable charge does not involve change of ownership or possession, but merely 
entitles the secured party to payment out of the fund generated by the property to the extent of 
the indebtedness.144 If the restriction on the transfer of the plates was statutory, then Cohen J’s 
approach gives greater effect to a statutory restriction on transfer than the cases considered 
above. Although the failure to identify the source of the restriction may appear to deprive the 
decision of relevance, it proposes a way to do justice between the parties without undermining 
statutory intent. By giving effect to the agreement as an equitable charge, Cohen J recognised 
the obligations as between the parties and in particular, the plaintiff’s financial interest. 
However, his Honour recognised that the plaintiff’s interest did not equate to a transfer of 
ownership but was merely an encumbrance.145 Such an approach enables the court to respect 
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restrictions on ownership that may be motivated by concerns over the identity of entitlement 
holders. 
The cases examined above reveal a willingness by courts to treat entitlements as having a 
proprietary character, and to enforce equitable interests arising from private transactions. This 
is despite the fact that, as a matter of law, the entitlement may be non-transferable, or 
transferable only with regulatory approval or subject to conditions. In the next Part we 
consider why courts have taken this approach and the implications for the realisation of the 
statutory objects of entitlement schemes. 
IV  Analysis of Approaches 
It is evident from our review of the cases that entitlements operate in diverse statutory 
frameworks. Each entitlement exists within its own statutory context, possesses unique 
attributes, and serves distinctive purposes. Despite this diversity, our research did not reveal 
detailed judicial analysis of the statutory framework to determine the character of the 
entitlement created, and the rules relating to it.146 Instead of approaching the issue as one of 
statutory interpretation, courts appear willing to presume that entitlements of all types are a 
species of property, at least for purposes of attracting the rules of property law. In Parts II and 
III we examined the legal justifications that courts have advanced for this approach in the 
cases. In this Part we discuss four practical considerations that may be influencing the courts’ 
departure from established principles of statutory construction. This Part concludes by 
examining the extent to which certain types of private transactions may undermine the 
statutory purpose.  
A Practical factors influencing the courts 
(1) Integration of entitlements in business assets 
In some cases the commercial realities of an industry may necessitate limited recognition of 
third party interests in entitlements. Participants in industries such as fishing often lack the 
resources to exploit entitlements individually. Accordingly, many entitlements are exploited 
by partnerships or pursuant to financing arrangements. In this context, courts have been 
willing to characterise entitlements as partnership property or property that may be the subject 
of a security interest. 
The characterisation of entitlements as partnership property is uncontroversial given the 
expansive definition of property in partnership legislation.147 In Tremblett v Tremblett, 
Handrigan J of the Newfoundland and Labrador Supreme Court held that a fishing licence 
exploited by two brothers was partnership property.148 The Court recognised that the licence 
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was beneficially co-owned despite the fact that the legislation only permitted one party to be 
registered as the legal holder.149  
In Yau Wah Hing v Yuen Kay Ming the Hong Kong Court of Appeal held that a bus 
licence that was not transferable under the statute was partnership property, and was held by 
the licensee on trust for the partnership.150 The Court cited with approval the following 
statement of Morritt LJ in Don King Productions Inc v Warren:151 
 
… partnership property … includes that to which a partner is entitled and which all the 
partners expressly or by implication agree should, as between themselves, be treated as 
partnership property. It is immaterial, as between the partners, whether it can be assigned by 
the partner in whose name it stands to the partners jointly. 
 
In Poulos v Abbott and Smith v Prestige Limousines, it is clear that the entitlement holders 
lacked the resources to exploit the relevant entitlements without financial assistance.152 In 
both cases, the courts gave effect to security interests in the entitlements. 
Another scenario which gives rise to a perceived commercial necessity to enforce 
equitable transactions is the sale of a physical asset, such as a fishing vessel, the value of 
which depends on an entitlement such as a fishing licence. Since licence transfers usually 
require approval, a temporary trust may be considered necessary in order to facilitate the sale 
of fishing enterprises including vessels. In Theriault v Corkum, the Nova Scotia Court of 
Appeal observed:153 
 
It would seem that business efficacy necessitates there be some trust arrangement with respect 
to the holding of licences until they can be transferred if sales of fishing boats are to be 
facilitated. 
 
The observation is noteworthy given that the dispute in Theriault v Corkum arose because the 
parties omitted to perfect the transfer when this became possible.154 
Within the category of non-state party disputes, the recognition that an entitlement is 
property for one purpose appears to influence its characterisation for other purposes where it 
may be less appropriate. In some partnership property cases the courts have expressed their 
conclusions in terms of beneficial ownership.155 Such recourse to general law notions of 
property is unnecessary given the expansive definition of property in partnership legislation 
and the interpretation attributed to this definition by the courts.156  
(2) Reliance on executive practice 
Secondly, the courts are reluctant to thwart commercial expectations that have arisen in 
reliance on executive practice. In particular, courts are receptive to submissions that they 
would unduly disrupt industry practices and commercial arrangements if they were to deny 
proprietary effect to transactions made in reliance on past executive practice of tolerating 
unauthorised transfers. This is particularly evident in the case law on Canadian fishing 
entitlements. The Canadian cases are replete with references to the chaos into which the 
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fishery industry would descend, were equity’s assistance to be withheld.157 While avoiding 
the language of estoppel or substantive legitimate expectations, Canadian courts have also 
made reference to the knowledge of the industry regulator that such arrangements are 
widespread.158 
(3) Conflation of transfer with relinquishment and reissue 
Thirdly, some of the cases rely on the executive policy of permitting “transfers” by 
relinquishment and reissue.159 As described above, the regulator may permit an entitlement 
holder to relinquish an entitlement in order to pass it to another person or entity. The regulator 
may re–issue the entitlement to the holder’s nominee if the nominated person or entity 
qualifies under the relevant statutes and policies. Although this process mimics a transfer, it is 
in truth an exercise of the discretion to issue entitlements subject to conditions.160 It is tightly 
circumscribed by statute and should not give rise to an unrestricted power to transfer the 
entitlement.161 It is contrary to principles of administrative law to require a regulator to 
exercise its discretion at the direction or behest of an entitlement holder.162 A regulator who 
simply gives effect to a private nomination may fail to exercise an independent discretion. 
(4) Reliance on legal advice 
Fourthly, the courts are cognisant of the involvement of legal professionals in advising on the 
form of transactions. In Loder v Citifinancial Canada the Supreme Court of Newfoundland 
and Labrador referred to the fact that Loder had acted upon advice when assessing whether he 
came to the court with clean hands.163 In Theriault v Corkum the Nova Scotia Supreme Court 
noted that the documents involved in the transaction were prepared by a barrister.164 On 
appeal, the Court of Appeal indicated that reliance on such legal advice was reasonable given 
the state of the authorities:165 
 
The decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal in [BCP v Sparrow] … would have 
indicated to counsel who prepared the agreements respecting the sale of the Sea Track that 
under similar regulations on the West Coast the trust agreements, whereby the beneficial 
interest in a licence is held by the vendor in trust for another, are not illegal and that in the 
absence of an expressed statutory prohibition the beneficial interest in a license is transferable. 
 
The final factor that undoubtedly influences the courts’ enforcement of trusts in respect of 
entitlements is the desire to do justice as between the parties to the dispute. The courts are 
disinclined to characterise transactions as illegal at the behest of parties who freely enter into 
them and then seek to resile from their obligations.166  
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Whilst these four practical concerns illustrate the complexity of regulation within this sphere 
of activity they do not provide a legal explanation for the decisions. 
B Trusts and inconsistency with statutory purpose 
The cases also reveal that the trusts employed by entitlement holders are designed to achieve 
a range of objectives, which lie along a spectrum in terms of the degree of inconsistency with 
statutory or executive policy. At one end of the spectrum are trusts that are imposed 
temporarily in order to effect a sale of a licence pending regulatory approval. These trusts do 
not undermine statutory or executive policy. Further along the spectrum, a trust may seek to 
transfer the economic benefit derived from an entitlement. Generally speaking, these would 
not appear to undermine policy objectives to any significant extent, although each case would 
need to be considered in its own statutory context. An example of such a trust is that in Ernst 
v Dumlich.167 Likewise, the creation of a security interest in respect of an entitlement may 
transfer limited rights to the economic benefit rather than a right to its use.168 Use of an 
entitlement in partnership may also involve a second party merely in a financial capacity. At 
the other end of the spectrum are trusts that purport to transfer the right to use an entitlement 
to a person who does not satisfy statutory or policy requirements. The most striking example 
is the trust employed in BCP v Sparrow, which sought to enable a non-Indian to use a licence 
which the regulations reserved exclusively for the use of Indians.169 Such trusts clearly 
subvert statutory policy. A partnership arrangement may also enable a non-qualified person to 
use an entitlement.  
The fact that trusts serve a variety of purposes which undermine policy to a greater or 
lesser extent was alluded to in Loder v Citifiancial Canada. At first instance, Osborn J of the 
Newfoundland and Labrador Supreme Court drew a distinction between temporary trusts that 
facilitate the transfer of fishing enterprises and those which are intended to continuously 
circumvent the regulations.170 However, on appeal, the Court took the view that the 
distinction was not supported in the authorities.171 
Courts have generally failed to distinguish between transfer of a beneficial interest in the 
profits derived from the entitlement, and the transfer of the right to use the entitlement, even 
though the latter is more likely to conflict with a statutory restriction on transfer. In many of 
the cases, the judgments do not clearly identify the subject matter of the transfer or trust. 
Despite the variation in the degree of inconsistency with statutory policy, there is 
remarkable uniformity in the enforcement of trusts by the courts. This is perhaps a reflection 
of the highly specific factual scenarios which have made it difficult for the courts to establish 
any categories. It may also be unpalatable to refuse to give effect to a trust in one case once it 
has been recognised in another. There is at least some acknowledgement in the cases that the 
development of the law in this area has not been in accordance with established principles. In 
Loder v Citifinancial Canada, Rowe JA observed:172 
 
[26] Trust agreements, like that given effect in this case, evade and thereby undermine 
fisheries policies such as fleet separation and adjacency. That is their purpose. Ordinarily, the 
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courts do not give effect to agreements that are contrary to public policy. However, repeatedly 
in argument we were told that to fail to give effect to such arrangements would cause chaos in 
the industry. The [DFO] was not present to confirm or deny this. Thus far, the courts have 
given effect to arrangements that have created significant anomalies in economic regulation of 
the fishery. At some point these anomalies may be so great that the courts should apply the 
general rule against giving effect to … agreements that are contrary to public policy. 
 
The willingness of courts to enforce security interests in entitlements which are non-
transferable by statute can also conflict with statutory or regulatory objects. For example, in 
Poulos Bros (Wholesale) Pty Ltd v Abbott, the Court enforced a security which took the form 
of an equitable assignment of a commercial crayfish-pot licence to a wholesaler, even though 
the licence was transferable only with regulatory approval and subject to a certification that 
the applicant “is principally engaged only in the occupation of fishing”.173  
On the current state of authorities it is exceedingly difficult for regulatory agencies to 
retain control over the holding of entitlements. Where entitlements are transferable by means 
of relinquishment and reissue to a qualifying party, they are liable to be held on trust without 
regard to executive policy. 
V  Conclusion 
An analysis of cases from a number of common law jurisdictions, including the United 
Kingdom, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Hong Kong, reveals that in the context of 
statutory entitlements, restrictions on transfers and denial of property provisions do not 
always operate as expected. Provisions that prohibit or restrict transfers have often been read 
down so as to apply to “legal title” only, leaving the parties free to transfer their entitlements 
in equity by means of a trust or the creation of a security interest. In other cases, entitlements 
that are declared by statute not to be property have been characterised as akin to property for 
the purposes of the principle of survivorship and the application of the doctrine of relief 
against forfeiture.174 
In some of the cases, judicial analysis of the statutory policy informing the restriction on 
transfer is absent or minimal. It is rare for a court to expressly acknowledge that private 
arrangements which it enforces subvert the legislative intention.175 The courts are willing to 
consider the statutory or executive policy but usually attribute little or no weight to it. 
Our analysis has identified a number of practical considerations that have influenced the 
development of the law in this manner. It is clear that there is a strong imperative for courts to 
give effect to certain types of transactions for reasons of commercial necessity. It is often 
impracticable for individuals to exploit entitlements alone and the value of certain assets 
depends on the capacity to transfer associated entitlements. However, the enforcement of 
interests in entitlements for these purposes has led to the wholesale recognition that 
entitlements are transferable as property. There has been a failure to distinguish between 
transactions purporting to transfer the profits derived from an entitlement and those which 
transfer the right of use. As a result, certain entitlements have been used by persons that do 
not qualify under the relevant scheme. Further, regulatory approval of transactions is viewed 
as a formality by industry participants. 
In light of the significant incursion of equity and property law principles into the field of 
statutory entitlements, sometimes in apparent disregard of statutory provisions, legislatures 
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should take particular care in drafting the legislative provisions for entitlement schemes.176 
The cases prompt the question of what is necessary in terms of legislative design in order for 
governments to retain control over entitlements and implement their policy objectives. On a 
number of occasions, courts have expressed the view that, had the legislature intended to 
prevent certain transactions, it would have used clearer language. In Ernst v Dumlich, 
Hinkson JA for the British Columbia Court of Appeal observed: “If the legislature wishes to 
enact stricter provisions with respect to the transfer of trapline [registrations] to nominees of 
foreign owners, it may do so, of course …”177 This statement was endorsed by the Supreme 
Court of British Columbia in BCP v Sparrow.178 A similar sentiment was expressed by 
Fogarty J in Armstrong v Public Trust where his Honour observed:179 
 
[23] This Court will not find that the legislature has so intervened to displace the common law 
position as to joint tenancy, by a side wind, when pursuing control over the allocation of scarce 
resources, as it is doing in the RMA. 
 
In the interests of certainty and efficiency, we recommend that legislatures consider the 
desired treatment of entitlements prospectively, rather than allowing important issues to be 
determined by default in the courts. To that end, our analysis suggests that legislatures 
seeking to regulate new activities by means of statutory entitlement schemes should bear the 
following points in mind. First, unless explicitly prohibited, courts tend to recognise that 
entitlements may be the subject of equitable ownership. Secondly, if the regulator determines 
that the entitlement holder should possess certain attributes or belong to a particular class, it is 
advisable to express these criteria in statute or regulation. This follows from the fact that the 
courts do not permit a decision maker to exercise a discretion through the indiscriminate 
application of a policy rule without regard to the particular merits of a given case.180 Thirdly, 
since entitlement holders may not have the financial resources to exploit the entitlement 
without financial investment from others, the legislature should consider the impact of 
statutory restrictions on the capacity to take security in entitlements. 
In order to provide further guidance for legislatures, a more detailed analysis of the legal 
basis of the courts’ approach is required. In particular, the cases raise the following legal 
issues. It is unclear whether statutory restrictions or prohibitions on transfer should be 
construed as applying to both legal and equitable transfers or only to the former.181 Even if a 
prohibition extends to an equitable transfer, this may not cover common equitable 
transactions such as a declaration of trust or an equitable assignment arising from an 
agreement to assign legal property. Some commentators consider that these transactions 
involve the creation of new equitable interests rather than the transfer of an existing 
                                                 
176 But see Makgill, above n 7, at 109–110 where the author warns against the wholesale dismissal of property 
rules in relation to entitlements to natural resources: “[L]egislators should not ignore a well-established body 
of law designed principally to govern the relations between people in respect of property. … Such principles 
must [be adapted to reflect] the sustainable management purpose of the RMA. But we need to take a serious 
look at the property characteristics of resource consents before moving down a path that aims to govern legal 
relations between people in respect of property purely according to the principles of administrative law.’ 
(Emphasis added.) 
177 Ernst v Dumlich (BCCA), above n 59, at [25]. 
178 BCP v Sparrow (BCSC), above n 55, at [21]. 
179 Armstrong v Public Trust, above n 15. 
180 Perder Investments Pty Ltd v Lightowler (1990) 25 FCR 150; Philip A Joseph Constitutional & 
Administrative Law in New Zealand (3rd ed, Brookers, Wellington, 2007) at 903–904. 
181 In a recent case concerning mining entitlements, the parties accepted that a provision requiring the prior 
approval applied to both legal and equitable transfers and the Court proceeded on this assumption: Hancock 
Prospecting Pty Ltd v Wright Prospecting Pty Ltd [2012] WASCA 216, 45 WAR 29 at [113]. However, the 
impugned conduct merely involved the exercise of an option and was held not to constitute a transfer but a 
call that property be transferred: at [134]. 
interest.182 This follows from the fact that the law does not distinguish between the legal and 
equitable title where both reside in the same person or entity.183 The resolution of this issue 
will depend on the breadth of the term “transfer” and whether it should be construed by 
reference to private law notions of what constitutes a transfer or the statutory purpose of the 
regime in question. Legislatures may have to adjust their terminology to reflect the outcomes 
of these inquiries. 
With respect to the judiciary, we submit that courts must look first and foremost to the 
objects of the Act pursuant to which an entitlement is created in order to ensure the rational 
development of the law.184 Courts should not approach disputes with the assumption that 
entitlements are property or that they constitute a single class of interest. On the contrary, 
entitlements are highly diverse. 
The rational development of the law is all the more critical due to the difficulties faced by 
legislatures when they attempt to intervene once commercial expectations have arisen that 
private transfers will be effective outside the statutory scheme. 
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